ILAR Journal Online, Volume 43(1) 2002: Implications of Human-Animal Interactions and Bonds in the Laboratory

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ILAR Journal V43(1) 2002
Implications of Human-Animal Interactions and Bonds in the Laboratory

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Implications

Ethical Implications of the Human-Animal Bond in the Laboratory
Lilly-Marlene Russow

Lilly-Marlene Russow, Ph.D., is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.

Abstract

This analysis of the moral implications of a human-animal bond in a research setting begins by describing a set of criteria that delineate the human-animal bond in general and form the foundation on which moral issues rest. Questions about if, when, and how such bonds are formed are discussed briefly; the discussion focuses on how the concept of a human-animal bond fits into standard moral theories. The conclusion is that "impartial" theories such as utilitarianism and deontological theories must be supplemented with an "ethics of caring" and that the moral duties engendered by the human-animal bond are best identified with such a supplemented theory.

Key Words: animal welfare; ethical theory; ethics of caring; human-animal bond; research animals

The general goal of this issue of ILAR Journal is multifaceted. Authors and editors are attempting to explore the ways researchers and caretakers interact with the animals for which they are responsible; to determine more specifically whether such responsible individuals can and do form true human-animal bonds; and if bonds are indeed formed, what effects (both positive and negative) they have on animal welfare and the quality and reliability of the research. In this article, in which I explore the ethical issues raised by such a bond, it is necessary first to consider the nature of a "human-animal bond" (HAB^1,2).

Although people have been talking about bonds between humans and animals for centuries, it has become a respectable academic area of research under that label only within the past 20 yr. It first emerged as an interdisciplinary issue that encompassed elements of epidemiology and social psychology and focused on how pets might be good for people. For example, one early study of patients with heart disease revealed that pet owners had a lower mortality rate than a matched group without pets (Beck and Katcher 1996). However, such studies do not translate readily to the laboratory setting because pets are obviously different in many ways from laboratory animals and because these studies focused on the benefits to humans and had little to report about how such a bond might affect animal welfare or research.

What, then, is the connection between this bond and ethics? To answer that question, we must first clarify the concept of an HAB. Second, we must try to determine whether it has any special implications for the inclusion of animals in our ethical deliberations. Finally, we must consider how such a bond might be relevant to animal research, both with respect to the validity of the research as well as the more basic questions of how to assess and ensure due consideration of animal welfare.

In one obvious way, the connections between the bond with ethics and with research are interrelated. Any consideration of the ethical dimensions must factor in the scientific validity inasmuch as a poorly designed experiment may not justify any diminution of animal welfare. Conversely, current regulations as well as the general climate demand that researchers build consideration of the "ethical price" into experimental design from the outset. (Ethical price is seen as a balance between benefits and harms, or among rights that are violated and respected.) Attention to the "three Rs" has become one popular way of formulating such expectations. I claim that ethical concerns are more basic; I believe that no responsible researcher would argue that we are justified in doing something unethical to generate good scientific data. The Tuskegee study is one example of this principle at work. However, Harlow's experiments on maternal drprivation, Taub's work with the "Silver Spring monkeys," and the now-infamous work at the University of Pennsylvania may turn out to be as important for research on animals as the Tuskegee study, along with other abuses, proved to be vital in defining the ethical limits of what can be done to humans in the name of science.

Defining the Concept

In their introduction to an early anthology on human-animal interaction, Davis and Balfour (1992) claim that there is no universally accepted definition of HAB. This lack of agreement still seems to be the case (cf., Bayne 2002). Thus, instead of trying to formulate a definition that would conclusively delineate all of the uses of this phrase, I, following several others (reviewed in Russow 1999), herein identify characteristics that make a useful distinction between an HAB and other ways of interaction. More specifically, I highlight aspects particularly relevant to ethical considerations in an effort to help identify a middle ground between a bond developed to its fullest and complete detachment among investigators, caretakers, veterinarians, and animals. The ultimate goal, of course, is to uncover the ways in which such bonding and other forms of interaction will promote animal welfare while still preserving the basic standards of good animal research. To achieve these goals, the following criteria seem most relevant as well as most widely agreed on:

HAB involves a relationship between a human and an individual animal. This is not to say that humans cannot form bonds with more than one animal, or vice versa. However, an HAB does not exist when someone views an aquarium or a mouse colony as a collective, rather than recognizing and relating to individuals within that group.
This first criterion is morally relevant because accurate assessment of animal welfare may require understanding the needs and normal behavior of an individual animal rather than thinking of it collectively as "mice," "dogs," or whatever generic term might be applied.
HAB is, in paradigmatic cases, reciprocal and persistent. No matter how fond you are of an animal, if it does not recognize you, there is no bond in the strongest or paradigmatic sense. Similarly, if you cannot identify a particular chicken from a flock, there is no bond. The notion of recognition (literally, re-cognition) implies multiple instances of contact rather than a single interaction, even though it may take only a single contact to begin establishing that bond.
Reciprocity, however, extends beyond mere recognition. Minimally, paradigm cases of HAB involve increased trust on the part of the animal and increased caring and understanding of the animal's needs on the part of the human. Note that although this relationship is reciprocal (i.e., both parties are involved), it is not necessarily symmetrical (i.e., a relationship in which each party is expected to maintain the same kind of relationship to the other). For example, the relationship between a parent and child is reciprocal, but not symmetrical.
HAB tends to promote an increase in well-being for both parties. This tendency, of course, is a generalization; and some HABs may not affect the well-being of one or the other party. However, the tendency is often a side effect rather than an intended goal. A caretaker may be required to handle a puppy in certain ways in an effort to socialize it, but following a script is not necessarily an HAB. In addition, if someone acquires a dog simply for protection or cheering up, the result may not be an HAB.
Other relevant examples of individuals who do not have an HAB include researchers who view animals merely as research tools and caretakers who think solely in terms of cages to be cleaned and paperwork to be completed. Such people may not even have a human-animal interaction (HAI^1,2) in any meaningful sense of that term inasmuch as both caretakers and graduate students being introduced to scientific methods are still sometimes urged not to become sentimental or emotionally attached to animals that are considered primarily as research tools.

All three of these conditions are necessary for a fully developed HAB; none is intended to be a solely sufficient condition. As noted above, they comprise a collective attempt to identify the aspects of an HAB that might be relevant to the determination of moral consideration. It is important to recognize that HABs are not all or nothing but instead, come in degrees.

Bonding should not foster special, one-sided care or treatment of laboratory animals. A person who favors one animal because he/she has bonded with it may compromise attention to other animals. Bonding can make it more difficult for the human if an animal must be sacrificed as part of the experiment, or even euthanized for other reasons. In addition, because animals handled often exhibit different results from animals not handled often (for better or worse), replication may be a problem unless standard care promotes such bonding. If all animals in a colony are given names (perhaps not practical with fish or mice, but more common with dogs or primates), they are more likely to be treated with special concern for their welfare (J. Albright, Purdue University, personal communication, 1997). This consequence suggests that in a colony in which some but not all of the animals are named, there may be differences in levels of care. If all animals are named, it seems to follow that they are more likely to be handled more uniformly.

The three conditions presented above imply collectively that the HAB is a form of "implicit contract," which is difficult to describe precisely. I use the term implicit contract not in the strictly legal sense, but rather in the way it has been used in moral and social philosophy at least as far back as the time of Thomas Hobbes--proceeding on an assumption of how other participants in a contract will behave and trusting that result. "Interest in" the other party is clearly too broad, inasmuch as a kidnapper has an interest in his victim and the victim with his captor. Something like the Aristotelian use of the term "friendship," although it is anthropomorphic, may be closer to the meaning.³ Thus, with all due reservations and qualifications, we might initially describe an implicit promise between the human and animal as something like, "We are friends; therefore you can/should trust me and feel safe with me, and I will treat you as a friend and meet your needs as well as I can."⁴

A term such as friendship is admittedly anthropomorphic and, according to Jerry Tannenbaum (1995), would presumably rest on the same shaky ground as "love" or "respect." We disagree, however, in that I believe such anthropomorphism (or "critical anthropomorphism," as Morton and colleagues [1990] describe it) is often justified. In addition, it may prove essential to progress in the area of behavioral science (Ristau 1991). Tannenbaum views such a description as prima facie unjustified on scientific grounds. Nevertheless, this debate exists for another day. At least we have articulated the issue on which we disagree.

As noted above, this relationship is not symmetrical because the "promise" of each party is different. Even though two parties must be involved, the concept of a promise initiates a strong moral obligation on the part of the individual who is capable of understanding the nature of the relationship. A weaker moral obligation is perhaps implied for other sorts of HAI.

If there is to be any consensus regarding the applicability of the HAB relationship in the laboratory, it must be distinguished from other forms of HAI. Again, this distinction is not meant to trivialize the moral obligations involved in any other sort of HAI, but only to explore the unique obligations of an HAB--bluntly, breaking a promise or betraying a trust, more than inflicting pain and suffering in the standard sense. As an oversimplified example, if I kick a strange dog for no reason, I have done a morally bad thing because I have inflicted unnecessary pain. If I kick a familiar dog that willingly comes when he is called and expects praise, that action, I believe, is morally worse. If this argument is sound, then HAB's carry a special, albeit not decisive, weight.

It is important to emphasize again that it is the underlying attitude, not the actual behavior, of the participants that separates an HAB from other sorts of HAI. "Scripted" interactions, whether 15 min of handling or daily "enrichment" procedures, would not by themselves count as an HAB, even though they might be morally relevant for other reasons, including factors such as the recognition of individual behavioral differences, which will help identify welfare needs or reduce stress in the animal.

Relevance to Moral Theory

Almost all of the dominant moral theories, including utilitarianism and deontological theories,⁵ emphasize impartiality, neutrality, or objectivity (e.g., "justice is blind"). This emphasis requires that the interests of morally significant individuals are accorded equal consideration, or that all moral subjects have equal intrinsic value. Thus, one cannot favor X over Y simply because one is fond of X, related to X, happens to know X, or is simply more familiar with X. Although traditional moral theories have almost always focused on persons, philosophers such as Peter Singer (1975, 1990, 1993) and Tom Regan (1983, 2001) have argued that at least some nonhuman animals must be considered in ethical deliberations. In Singer's case, this argument means that all sentient beings deserve equal consideration⁶; Regan argues that all "subjects of a life" (which includes at least all adult mammals) have equal inherent value. Both philosophers also endorse the traditional value of impartiality and objectivity required by the traditions (utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, respectively) they follow. However, if impartiality is an essential part of moral reasoning, then special attention to an HAB would seem to be an example of sentiment overriding the sort of rational deliberation that ought to be the proper foundation of moral judgments.

Nevertheless, the traditional theories have often been criticized precisely because they fail to give proper weight to the importance of personal relationships. In their purest form, they do not allow consideration of bonds between humans, such as the parent-child bond, love between spouses, or friendship. This lack of consideration is clearly inconsistent with our carefully considered, deeply held intuitions about such situations: for example, the idea that we have moral obligations to our own children that we do not have to others, or that it is sometimes permissible to favor a friend or relative. Moreover, we recognize that forming such relationships is an essential part of what it means to be a person; a human being who cannot love, form friendships, and recognize the uniqueness of other individuals may not be considered a fully developed moral person. Thus, a moral theory that requires total impartiality fails to accommodate special human relationships. Attempts to address such inadequacy, coupled with arguments that nonhuman animals also ought to figure into our ethical deliberations, open the door to explore the moral significance of the HAB.

There are two main strategies for including the moral significance of personal relationships. The first, more conservative, approach is to argue that despite the initial appearance of indifference, traditional utilitarianism or deontological theories can recognize friendship in moral deliberations. The second strategy is to supplement or even supplant these traditional views with an alternative approach to ethics, of which the most familiar are the "ethics of caring," often associated with feminist ethics, and some forms of "virtue ethics."

The conservative approach argues that friendship is either part of the good to be maximized (i.e., part of the most effective way of maximizing good) or an aspect of what is to be respected in other persons. Some utilitarians argue that a vision of the good should not be limited to a single thing such as pleasure or the satisfaction of preferences, but instead should recognize that there are several distinct components of the good, which may include friendship. Alternatively, even a classical utilitarian might admit that friendship is conducive to an overall increase in happiness, in that friends are in a better position to judge what will be good for their friend than a complete stranger, or even an ideal observer. Finally, although Kant thought that rationality was both a necessary and a sufficient condition for respecting other persons, other deontologists have argued that deep, meaningful relationships such as friendship are part of what commands respect for other persons. Such respect can include certain duties to one's friends as well as rights and licenses.

These conservative strategies make it possible to understand how the HAB might also carry moral weight. Such bonds might be intrinsically good, at least for some people and some animals, and therefore be something to respect and even foster; or they may promote an increased understanding and appreciation of an animal's welfare. Alternatively, part of the "telos"⁷ of some human and nonhuman animals may require the opportunity to form bonds including trust, loyalty, or love; surely these characteristics are worthy of moral respect. Unfortunately, although numerous studies have focused on the benefits of an HAB to the human partner, assessments of the benefits to the animal have been largely anecdotal.

As noted above, there are more radical approaches to this problem. An ethics of caring, originally associated with the work of Carol Gilligan, emphasized the legitimacy of considering the particular details of each situation in making ethical decisions, especially the personal relationships among those a decision or action affects. If this emphasis is indeed a needed amendment or revision of traditional moral theories, the HAB, as well as relationships between persons, carries ethical significance.

None of the approaches described above imply that HABs are always morally good. Although they can and should promote animal welfare, a well-meaning but misguided belief about what is good for the animal can have exactly the opposite effect (the idea that everything in a cage ought to be sterilizable comes to mind). If animals have different sorts of care, handling, or attention, these factors can affect research findings. Some people take this idea even farther and claim that remaining objective, not forming a "personal attachment" to research animals, is an important quality for researchers and caretakers to develop; that anything less is unprofessional. I personally think that this last view is outdated and often reflects a lack of concern for animal welfare. However, my belief is based on personal and anecdotal evidence, so more research is needed to confirm or disconfirm my opinion.

To summarize, if we recognize that the complete impartiality and abstractness demanded by many versions of classical ethics is impoverished, a corrective move is required. Any such correction that recognizes the moral significance of personalized relationships between persons will provide ways in which such bonds translate into special moral duties, rights, or privileges. Many of the arguments that justify giving moral significance to friendship will also apply to HABs. There are, of course, other moral obligations that apply to any form of HAI, such as the responsibility to learn how to recognize and alleviate distress in an animal; however, HABs carry a special significance.

Specific Implications

As noted at the beginning of this article, HAB was originally conceived of as a relationship between pets and people. However, it has since been extended to cover the relationship between some farmers or ranchers and their animals, and even in some cases to the connection between a hunter and his prey. Although some of these claims are controversial, they can serve as first steps in defining what an HAB in the laboratory setting might look like. Where a bond exists, special moral obligations come into play, whether they are framed in terms of trust, friendship, respect, or simply a better understanding of what contributes to a particular animal's welfare.

When an HAB is considered as a type of promise, as suggested above, then severing the bond abruptly and without adequate justification (e.g., euthanizing an animal merely for convenience) is a betrayal of trust, a broken promise, and a general repudiation of the bond. This example may help explain why the dispute about the use of random source animals, generally viewed as former pets, is so controversial. Because animals that are part of an HAB, by definition, are not viewed merely in economic terms, or as research tools, it is likely that their welfare will receive more careful attention.

For all of these reasons, researchers must continue to question the barriers that have traditionally been erected against forming HABs in the name of objectivity and to investigate seriously the ways in which fostering the formation of HABs can promote animal welfare without compromising the scientific respectability of research.

¹Abbreviations used in this article: HAB, human-animal bond; HAI, human-animal interaction.

²Hereafter, HAB refers to a human animal bond in the sense discussed in the text below, and HAI, to human/animal interactions somewhat more generally. Technically, HABs are a subset of HAIs; however, in the interest of clarity and unless otherwise indicated, I use HAI when discussing relationships that may share some features with an HAB but do not meet all of the criteria. Very casual or "impersonal" interactions may not even count as an HAI.

³The term "friendship," for simplicity, is used to refer to a paradigm of personal relationships. It is not intended to exclude other sorts of relationships, some of which have been mentioned earlier.

⁴Most such promises involve the human taking the first part and the animal the second. However, I can think of some reverse instances (albeit none that are directly relevant to research, except perhaps the controversial issue of random source dogs), such as an assistant dog or a horse that one relies on to choose the best way to negotiate a rocky path.

⁵Utilitarianism defines an action as morally good just in case that action produces the best possible balance of benefit versus harm. The interests of all who are affected must be given equal consideration. Deontological theories define morality in terms of following rules or principles, or respecting the rights of others, regardless of consequences. Those principles or rights are to be applied impartially. See also Herzog 2002.

⁶As always, it is important (although often ignored) to distinguish between equal consideration and equal treatment, as Peter Singer (1975) noted.

⁷The term "telos," originally associated with Aristotle, has more recently been used by Bernard Rollin (1981). Roughly translated, it refers to the goal or purpose dictated by the intrinsic nature of the being that possesses it.

References

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Morton DB, Burghardt GM, Smith JA. 1990. Section III: Critical anthropomorphism, animal suffering, and the ecological context. Hastings Center Report (Spec Suppl):13-19.

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