Online Issues

ILAR Journal Vol 45(3)

The Authors Reply

First, we would like to thank Nisbet and Paul for their very thoughtful letter, which helps to move the discussion forward. We would also like to point out that we agree with several of their main points, in particular the following: (1) the importance of having knowledgeable experts on IACUCs and any group responsible for formulating legislation or regulations on animal research, (2) the fact that ethical values are the core of animal welfare laws, and (3) the benefits to both humans and animals that can accrue from responsible and well-designed research. However, they raise several issues that require further scrutiny. Two of the most crucial issues are the role of ethics in evaluating scientific research (indeed, the whole relation between science and ethics) and the more specific challenge to our use of the term "distress." The designated role of IACUCs also requires clarification.

Ethics and the sciences are two different disciplines, but they must work hand in hand. The benefit of this synergy has been recognized for nearly half a century in human research, as witnessed by the outrage about the Tuskegee studies on syphilis and the many "experiments" in Nazi death camps, as well as the less dramatic emphasis on designing better informed consent agreements (Jones 1993). Good ethical decisions must be informed by good science, but they require going beyond the question of whether good scientific data might result. Debates rage even today about whether the data from Nazi hypothermia studies should be used--not because the science was flawed, but because of the methods used to obtain these data (Moe 1984; Sheldon 1989).

Nisbet and Paul mention many controls that they believe are already adequate to ensure that wildlife research meets the highest standards ranging from peer review to the Endangered Species Act. It must be remembered, however, that not all research is peer reviewed, and when it is, most journals and conferences rely solely on scientists who have often been trained to look just at the science, not the ethics. The legislation they cite covers only a small percentage of the animals used in wildlife research--animals from black bears to field mice would not be covered unless the research were conducted on federal land. Even then, oversight and review are minimal and often the responsibility of personnel who are untrained in the complexities of evaluating research projects.

There are, of course, observable and measurable impacts of methodology, as Nisbet and Paul mention. They are often the best indications of whether one method of capturing, handling, or marking an animal is better than another. However, we cannot ignore the fact that National Institutes of Health guidelines specifically state that if a procedure causes distress to a human, we must assume that it will also cause distress in an animal, unless we have good reason to think otherwise. Thus, their proposed limitations on IACUCs are contrary to the basic guidelines that an IACUC must follow. Considering "distress"--using that specific term--is part of their charge.

There is another reason for resisting the suggestion that "transient negative impact" is preferable to "distress" when evaluating the impact of research on animals. Some of the impact may not be immediately obvious, but can have long-term effects. Migratory, territorial, or social animals may show long-term changes that would not be immediately obvious. This evidence is particularly important to keep in mind in evaluating wildlife research, because many studies involve only brief contact or observation of the animals.

Finally, Nisbet and Paul "reject the notion that ethical considerations in wildlife biology somehow differ from those pertaining to laboratory-based research involving animals." We certainly agree that the general ethical and regulatory principles remain the same, although the two cases pose different specific questions that an IACUC would have to consider. Methods of capture are rarely an issue in laboratory research. Conversely, the quality of housing may not be a factor in wildlife research. Selective breeding and frequent contact with humans can produce animals that are more acclimated to handling and living in a laboratory setting. Thus, we agree with Nisbet and Paul's plea for biologists to become more involved in IACUC deliberations, and lend their expertise to consider these important questions.

To summarize, we have argued that (1) research must be evaluated against ethical as well as scientific standards, and (2) IACUCs are charged with just this responsibility and with trying to determine the level of pain or distress to which animals might be subject. This argument by no means ignores or undervalues the importance of much of the research, but rather highlights the complexities of evaluating the ethical dimension of animal research, particularly wildlife research.

References

Jones J. 1993. Bad Blood. 2nd ed. New York: The Free Press.

Moe K. 1984. Should the Nazi research data be cited? Hastings Ctr Rep 14:4-7.

Sheldon M. 1989. Commentary--Nazi data: Dissociation from evil. Hastings Ctr Rep 19:16-17.

Lilly-Marlene Russow
Professor
Department of Philosophy
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana

Peter Theran
Vice President of Animal Science
Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Boston, Massachusetts